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Abstract
Knowledge management has emerged as a growing field of practice and research but
the concept of knowledge itself remains vague.  This is an unsatisfactory situation
that may well hinder the development of knowledge management theory and
practice.  In this paper Alexander et. al.’s (1991) educational knowledge framework
is combined with Clancey’s (1997a) work on situated cognition to provide a clear
framework for knowledge management.  This provides us with the critical distinction
between knowledge as situationally dependent and enacted human capacity, and
knowledge representations.  ‘Knowledge’ can thus only be managed indirectly,
through managing human talent, a process that should be integrated with the
management of knowledge representations.
1. Introduction
The idea that ‘knowledge’ is economically important has been discussed, if only sporadically, since at
least 1945, [Hayek 45; Boulding 66] and received growing attention from the 1960s [Lamberton 71].
The idea that it could and should be ‘managed’, however, seems not to have been seriously considered
until a decade or so later.  Since the mid-1990s, ‘knowledge management’ has emerged as a rapidly
growing field of management activity, enquiry, writing and research [Scarborough et.al. 99; Hedlund
94; Nonaka and Takeuchi 95; Drucker 93], and has been described as involving a «paradigm shift» in
business management [Nonaka 94, Nonaka et.al. 96].  
Contemporary interest in knowledge management is due to a number of developments including
difficulties experienced in the aftermath of 1980s downsizing activities; maturation of ideas relating to
information management; growing competitive pressures leading organizations to look more to the
market, and to customer service relations; and the emergence of the resource-based perspective on
business strategy [Covin & Stivers 97].  The field has been dominated by writers and practitioners
from the information systems and related disciplines [Scarborough et.al. 99] although the critical
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significance of the human dimension, and allied management techniques has increasingly been
recognized [e.g. Davenport et.al. 98; van der Spek and Spijkervet 97; von Krogh 98; Snowden 97].
One characteristic of the field of knowledge management is that little attention has been paid to what
would appear to be a central concept - ‘knowledge’.  While disciplines such as education that also
require an operational definition of knowledge also appear to have neglected this issue [Alexander
et.al. 91] I believe it is both necessary and useful to attend to this issue.  The phrase ‘knowledge
management’ implies, like ‘operations management’, or ‘human resource management’ a particular
focus of  management activities.  Yet if managers do not have a clear idea about what ‘knowledge’ is,
we cannot evaluate knowledge management practices, understand the effects of actions taken in the
name of knowledge management, assess the relationship of knowledge management to other
management activities, or evaluate the claim that knowledge management is just another fad of
consultants and academics.
In this paper I will outline some perspectives on knowledge drawn from education, and from situated
cognition.  References to epistemology, the traditional arena for discussing ‘knowledge’ will be
minimal as by and large epistemologists appear not to have been concerned with operationalizable
definitions, but with wider concerns which can safely be left to one side for the present.
2. Knowledge Management and Knowledge
Hedlund (1994) pointed out that it is not clear precisely what ‘knowledge management’ means.  A
review of knowledge management and organizational learning literature suggested ‘knowledge
management’ is a multi-faceted, multi-layered concept definable as: «any process or practice of
creating, acquiring, capturing, sharing and using knowledge ... to enhance learning and performance in
organizations.» [Scarborough et. al. 99].  Lank (1997) suggested that knowledge management involves
«collecting, connecting, creating and applying knowledge for short term and long term sustainability».
Mackintosh et.al. (1999) claim that knowledge management is concerned with managing both
«knowledge assets» («knowledge regarding markets, products, technologies and organizations») and
the processes that act upon those assets.  Lank (1997) also suggested that knowledge management
entailed facilitating connections between people, arguing that effective knowledge management ensures
people with needs can find people who know within an organization.  Myers on the other hand
emphasised the capture and storage of knowledge in organizations’ systems, processes, products,
rules, and culture [Myers 96].
The delineation of the field of knowledge management is likely to rest on how the word ‘knowledge’
is defined both implicitly and explicitly. Some authors have suggested that it is not productive to
attempt to define knowledge [Snowden 97], or that it is of little use to practitioners to engage in
conceptual analysis [Davenport et.al. 98].  Others have, however, attempted define knowledge, and have
largely done so in terms of ‘information’. Hedlund, for example, acknowledged that ‘knowledge’ and
‘information’ should be distinguished but he used them interchangeably [Hedlund 94].  Myers (1996)
called organizational knowledge «processed information», while Davenport and his colleagues (1998)
defined knowledge as «information combined with experience, context, interpretation and reflection.  ...
a high-value form of information ...». Nonaka and his colleagues describe knowledge as «a
meaningful set of information that constitutes a justified true belief and/or an embodied technical skill»
[Nonaka et.al. 96].
Equating knowledge with information does not get us very far. Nothing is said in these accounts about
how ‘processing’ or ‘combination’ transforms ‘information’ into ‘knowledge’, or how information
acquires ‘meaning’ or becomes ‘constituted’ as a belief.  Instead we find that one abstract concept,
knowledge, is defined in terms of another equally abstract concept, ‘information’, and since this is left
undefined a common-sense understanding is implicitly assumed.  This, however, will not do: Stamper
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(1996) has shown that information is a vague and elusive concept susceptible of being understood in a
variety of ways.  The philosophers’ definition of knowledge as «justified true belief» [cited in Nonaka
and Takeuchi 95; see also Nonaka et.al. 96] was apparently criticized in ancient times on the grounds
that it raises the question of how the justifiers themselves can be justified [Brown 94].  Besides,
philosophers may have departed from this view, preferring to define knowledge as «true, warranted
belief»; justification is insufficient as something can be justified even if it rests on false premises
[Klein 98].
The situation as regards a definition of knowledge in the field of knowledge management is thus
clearly very unsatisfactory.  Yet this has not hindered the extraordinary proliferation of apparently
different kinds of ‘knowledge’. Tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge [e.g. Nonaka & Takeuchi 95]
are widely used.  In addition we find terms like know-how, know-what, know-why [e.g. Whitehill 97;
Quinn et.al. 96; Bonaventura 97]. Other typologies include symbol-type; embodied, embrained,
encultured, and formal [Collins 93] and Teece (2001) refers to codified, tacit, organizational and,
personal knowledge, and to knowledge embodied or embedded in «technology» [see also Blackler 93,
95].  These typologies are all largely lists - they lack the discussion of categories and definitional
principles that should accompany the development of a serious typology.  Moreover, generally little or
no evidence is offered to substantiate the claim to a knowledge-type other than an illustration to
indicate what the creator of the term wants to indicate.  We also find different uses being made of the
same term.  Collins (1993) refers to tacit knowledge as «located in society» whilst for Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995) it is personal and private.  Above all there is no attempt to show how these alleged
types are actually connected with each other: in other words, how ‘knowledge’ is actually being
defined.
Perhaps this confusion is inevitable.  Alexander et. al. (1991) note the view that terminological
precision and delimitation only happen when some kind of major breakthrough occurs, and that as
long as authors are consistent in themselves, a unified terminology is not necessary. On the other hand
failure to establish a coherent terminological framework hinders communication, which can have
further practical consequences [Alexander et. al. 91].  Knowledge management is still young, and has
not reached any major point of breakthrough but a deeper source of the confusion probably lies with
the subject-matter itself.  Dewey and Bentley argued that «knowledge» is a «loose name», one of those
««vague words» one is at times compelled to use» because it has been used to refer to a great many
often different things [Dewey & Bentley 49].  Bentley noted that «Whenever men apply the word,
[«knowledge»] living organisms are involved also.» [Ratner & Altman 64] but Teece (2001) among
others writes of ‘knowledge’ being ‘in’ technology!  The present confusion in education, and
knowledge management, would seem to confirm Dewey and Bentley’s judgement of half a century
ago.
I do not propose to resolve a problem that has occupied many great minds over the centuries, but
simply to describe some recent discussion of ‘knowledge’ from outside the field of knowledge
management in the hope that this will facilitate discussion and practice within that field.  I shall also
follow Dewey and Bentley (1949) in using ‘knowledge’ in a loose way throughout much of this
discussion.
3. Perspectives on Knowledge
Knowledge management shares with education and artificial intelligence the need for a practical
working definition or conceptualization of ‘knowledge’.  Alexander et. al. (1991) and Case (1996)
have discussed the issue from the perspective of education while Clancey in particular (e.g. 1997a) has
developed the idea of situated cognition from a base in artificial intelligence.  We will begin with
Case's (1996) account, then look at Alexander et. al.'s (1991) framework before outlining a situated
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cognitive perspective on knowledge.  The relationship of these to autopoietic and connectionist
perspectives [von Krogh et. al. 96; Sierhuis & Clancey 97; Venzin, et. al. 98] will be noted in the
conclusion.
3.1 Empiricism and Rationalism
Case (1996) suggested there are three important traditions regarding ‘knowledge’: the empiricist, the
rationalist, and cultural or socio-historic perspectives.  Here we will deal briefly with the empiricist and
rationalist perspectives; the cultural or socio-historical perspective is closely allied to situated cognition,
and will be discussed separately.
Empiricism assumes there is an external world which we perceive through stimuli affecting our senses
[Case 96].  We detect patterns in those stimuli, which are subsequently stored in memory as
knowledge. The external stimuli are thus the source of all knowledge which is consequently universal,
and objective.  Treating individuals as metaphors for organizations, this approach is applied to
organizations which are thus said to process and transform information obtained from outside, derive
knowledge as a result of processing this information, and store it in organization-wide knowledge
structures [Aadne et. al. 96; see also von Krogh et.al. 96].  Knowledge can thus be defined as «a
repertoire of patterns that we have learned to detect and operations that we can execute on these
patterns» [Case 96].
The rationalist approach, on the other hand, allocates a central role to individuals' minds in the
construction of knowledge [Case 96].  From this perspective, the senses provide data to the mind, that
in turn imposes order on what is perceived: in place of mind as pattern detector we have mind as
pattern creator. Knowledge is thus seen as originating primarily in the person’s actions in and on the
world, and therefore as located in individual cognitive processes [Case 96].  A definition of knowledge
consistent with this perspective is that it is «something that is constructed by the mind, and evaluated
according to rational criteria ...» [Case 96].
It would seem there is little to choose between empiricism and rationalism for knowledge management
purposes.  Both are primarily concerned with the ultimate origins and nature of knowledge, issues that
are of marginal interest to knowledge management.  In so far as knowledge managers are concerned
with knowledge creation, both empiricism and rationalism appear to attribute this to individuals
interacting with their environment. Managing the process of person-to-environment relations
effectively is thus suggested by both viewpoints: the difference is that empiricism stresses the
determining role of the environment; rationalism, that of the individual.  As we will see, this idea is
incorporated in the situated perspective.
3.2 Knowledge in Learning and Literacy
Alexander et. al. (1991) noted while the construct of 'knowledge' was exceedingly important in
cognition and learning, there were some difficulties arising from terminological imprecision.  They
reviewed uses of knowledge-related terms focusing on literature on cognition and literacy on the basis
of which they constructed a conceptual framework, and developed some definitions.  In this section I
will outline and comment on their framework, drawing in some of the definitions.  Their framework
was not explicitly connected with situated cognition but I will argue that it is compatible with that
approach, and offers additional dimensions that are useful in this context.
They defined 'knowledge' broadly to cover all that someone knows or believes to be true, regardless of
whether verified or not [Alexander et. al 91].  They also assume that all forms of knowledge are "fluid
and dynamic", meaning that forms vary between and within individuals.  Further, forms of knowledge
are interactive, meaning one form can influence another [Alexander et. al 91].  Against this background
they proposed a framework (Figure 1) within which we can view individuals as having "prior
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knowledge" which is critical in any situation.  «Prior knowledge» is a term synonymous with
background, experiential, and pre-existing knowledge among other terms [Alexander et. al 91] and
takes two forms: tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge.  
Sociocultural
knowledge
tacit knowledge
Conceptual
knowledge
Construction
Metacognitive
knowledge
Figure 1 - Prior knowledge [Alexander et. al. 91]
Tacit knowledge is simply knowledge of which we are normally or currently not aware [Alexander et.
al 91].  It is divisible into two aspects - "sociocultural knowledge" and the rest.  Sociocultural
knowledge is so to speak a filter through which all experiences pass, specifically here the beliefs of the
person’s group, culture and so on [Alexander et. al 91].  They do not specify additional dimensions of
tacit knowledge simply implying an ‘other’ tacit knowledge covering all other fields and aspects of
knowledge other than the sociocultural. This tacit knowledge base is, they claim, largely unrealized and
unanalyzed, but parts of it can always come into consciousness, and thus be studied, although it may
also be that some parts of tacit knowledge never reach explicitness [Alexander et. al 91]
Explicit knowledge is "knowledge that is directly guiding on-going interaction with the world;
analyzed knowledge" [Alexander et. al 91].  In other words, explicit knowledge is that part of tacit
knowledge which is currently activated by some on-going situation in which the individual is
partaking.  Explicit knowledge is also divided into two aspects: knowledge of concepts and ideas
(«conceptual knowledge»), and knowledge about knowledge («metacognitive knowledge») [Alexander
et. al 91].  Both types are further subdivided but the details need not concern us here.  Implicitly the
‘container’ of tacit knowledge in all forms, as well as both forms of explicit knowledge, is the brain or
‘mind’ of an individual.
Alexander et. al. (1991) complete their framework by proposing a 'mechanism' for linking the
individual's knowledge base with the external world.  This 'knowledge interface' or "bridge between
prior knowledge and external conditions" they call «construction» [Alexander et. al 91].  The
dimensions and functioning of this 'bridge' are only sketched, but it appears they intend to suggest that
it is through the 'interface' with the external world that aspects of the individuals knowledge-base (tacit
knowledge) are made explicit.  Thus they state that "conceptual knowledge … is built from the
activation and utilization of the individual's prior knowledge…" [Alexander et. al 91].  As a result the
individual's "system of knowledge … is continually in a flux as a consequence of its confrontation
with the world external to it" [Alexander et. al 91].
Alexander et. al.'s definition of knowledge could well be adopted by knowledge management writers
since it is one most implicitly use - i.e. that ‘knowledge’ is simply ‘what people know’.  Their terms
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tacit and explicit knowledge, however, differ significantly from the way they are used in knowledge
management literature.
Their term ‘tacit knowledge’ partly mirrors that of knowledge management writers since they propose
that some tacit knowledge may never become explicit or reach the level of consciousness.  On the other
hand, first they use tacit knowledge, in effect, as synonymous with ‘knowledge’ in the sense of what
someone knows: their terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘tacit knowledge’ appear indistinguishable as regards
the object to which they refer.  Second, they make the distinction between sociocultural knowledge and
‘other’ tacit knowledge.  On the whole, therefore, their term ‘tacit knowledge’ is richer and broader in
scope than the identical knowledge management term although it could perhaps be argued that
implicitly knowledge management writers also mean ‘what someone knows’ when they write ‘tacit
knowledge’.  
Alexander et.al.’s version of explicit knowledge is quite different, though also not incompatible with,
the familiar knowledge management term. For them, explicit knowledge is that portion of tacit
knowledge currently active, and (implicitly) of which the individual is aware.  It is therefore not
necessarily separated from the knowing individual.  In so far as the person is aware of this knowledge,
and they can express some of it in words the can make it ‘explicit’ in the more usual sense of the term.
Since this implies that some explicit knowledge (in Alexander et.al.’s sense) might be impossible to
express in words, this must remain tacit (in the more restricted but familiar sense of this term).  Their
‘explicit knowledge’ thus consists of both explicit and tacit knowledge in the usual but more limited
senses of those terms.
3.3 Situated Cognition and Cultural or Socio-Historical Perspectives
Cultural or socio-historical perspectives on knowledge were identified by Case as a third tradition
originating in the cultural-historical school of psychology of which Vygotsky was a founding figure
[Case 96].  This perspective is also known as activity theory [Engeström and Miettinen 99] and
emphasizes a historical, object-oriented and collective approach to human activity and knowledge
[Engeström and Miettinen 99; see also Blackler 93; Engeström et.al. 90, 99; Engeström 93].  Activity
theory shares many key assumptions with situated cognition, as well as with pragmatic philosophy,
symbolic interactionism, situated learning, and theories of mediated action [Engeström and Miettinen
99; Star 96; Lave and Wenger 91; Clancey 97a; Sierhuis and Clancey 97; Wertsch 98].  Because of
this, and because situated cognitive perspectives on knowledge/knowing appear more fully developed
than those of activity theory, discussion of the cultural or sociocultural approach will be subsumed
within that of situated cognition.
Situated cognition is part of the emerging «situative perspective» on human behaviour, learning,
development, cognition, and psychology [Greeno et.al. 98; Putnam & Borko 00]. ‘Situated cognition’
is something of a misnomer since its proponents argue that all cognition is situated.  For the present,
however, we have to use this term to distinguish it from mainstream cognitive science.
Conceptualization of knowledge and knowing within the context of situated cognition owes much to
Clancey’s discussion of problems arising from the representationist legacy in artificial intelligence
[e.g. Clancey 95, 97a, 97b].  His argument is a complex one, ranging as it does from artificial
intelligence and cognitive science to ecological psychology, models of brain functioning, and the
sociology of knowledge.  He also emphasises the importance of ‘activity’, a key socio-historical
concept, although he appears to use it in a less specific sense than the latter tradition.
Clancey defined knowledge as the «capacity to interact, to reflect, to innovate.» (1995); «to coordinate
and sequence behavior» (1997b); the «capacity to engage in an activity» (1997b:). Ryle, whose debt he
acknowledged [Clancey 95], similarly argued that: «‘Know’ is a capacity verb... of that special sort
that is used for signifying that the person described can bring things off, or get things right. ...» [Ryle
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49/63].  The suggestion to view ‘knowledge’ as a capacity was contrasted with the more traditional
one of seeing it as some kind of «static «body»» [Clancey 97a].  This distinction is an important one.
Typically to talk about ‘knowledge’ we employ metaphors that suggest it is a ‘thing’ that people have,
that can be stored, and transferred in ‘containers’, and so on [Reddy 79].  ‘Capacity’ could be
understood still as referring to a ‘thing’ but whether it can be meaningfully understood as capacity if
considered apart from ‘being possessed’ is questionable.  Assuming A is a capacity of B, if it is
separated from B, then it ceases to be a capacity of B, and becomes something else: it is only a capacity
when integral to B.  Considering ‘knowledge’ to be indicative of some relationship between a knower
and a known then this indicates we should consider ‘knowledge’ to exist only in the context of a
knower-known relationship (or transaction) [Dewey and Bentley 49; Clancey 97a].  
While some of the language used here implicitly relates to individuals it is important to recognize that
situated cognition, in common with activity theory, regards the individual:society relationship as
complementary, not oppositional.  Rosenblatt, writing from an altogether different disciplinary context,
suggested we can view language as «at once basically social and intensely individual» [Rosenblatt 94],
a notion compatible with both activity theory and situated cognition.  From an activity theory
perspective Toulmin suggested that knowledge can be described as the established procedures of any
professional discipline, «at a given time» [Toulmin 99, original emphasis]. While Toulmin confined
his comments to «professional work», there seems no reason not to extend his definition to any and all
kinds of human activity. Knowledge is something subject to verification by procedures accepted by
social groups («communities of practice» - Lave and Wenger 91; see also Kuhn 70), and not just an
attribute of individuals. These knowledge procedures are always the property of groups or collectivities
of people as they are developed through interaction and dialogue between individuals, in the context of
activities such as work.
Clancey suggests that a more appropriate metaphor for knowledge, as befitting a capacity, is of
«energy» [Clancey 95; 97b].  Maxwell, whose work on electricity paved the way for the twentieth
century revolutions in physics, wrote that his work showed that «the energy of a material system is
conceived as determined by the configuration and motion of that system» [Maxwell 1877, quoted in
Dewey and Bentley 49].  This clearly fits well with the idea that knowledge is «dynamically
constructed as we conceive of what is happening to us, speak, and move» [Clancey 97b]; and that
knowing occurs in the process of acting [Sierhuis & Clancey 97].  Further, Clancey suggests that
«knowledge» «corresponds to conceptualizing and other representing processes in the brain» [Clancey
97b] and is simultaneously «inherently «neural» in form» (as a process in the brain), and
simultaneously «inherently social in content» because it develops with respect to activities, which are
themselves socially constructed [Clancey 97b].  Cognition can in fact be understood as ‘situated’ in
three analytical senses: functional or social, structural or interactive, and behavioural or psychological
[Clancey 97a; Clancey et.al. 98].
Changing the order here to functional, behavioural, and structural highlights the implicit temporal
dimension underlying the three categories in a way that clarifies their interrelationships.  The
functional or social perspective emphasises the social grounding to how people interpret what they are
doing, their intentional stance, and how that can be understood to arise and be shaped.  An individual’s
«knowledge is functionally situated as that of a person who participates in our society in a certain
way»; «knowledge of activities ... is with respect to social relationships and purposes» [Clancey 97a].
Kuhn’s (1970) account of how novice scientists acquire the appropriate paradigms provides another.
Kuhn argued that it is only by doing exercises that a student discovers how to see their problems as
like those already encountered, and subsequently to view «the situations that confront him as a scientist
in the same gestalt as other members of his specialists’ group.  ... they are no longer the same
situations he had encountered when his training began.  He has meanwhile assimilated a time-tested
and group-licensed way of seeing.» [Kuhn 70]. Studies of negotiated order [e.g. Strauss et. al. 63] and
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recent ethnographies of work [e.g. Orr 90, 96] also illustrate how the process of collective formation of
working procedures is developed and sustained. From this perspective, situated cognition is a theory of
conceptual content: «knowledge is inherently social in content» [Clancey 97b].  We might add that
knowing also entails social processes - it is not simply that content is socially determined.
The second sense in which cognition is situated is a behavioural [Clancey 97a], or psychological one
[Clancey et. al. 98]. Cognition is behaviourally situated in that in performing, «perception, movement,
and conceptualization are changing with respect to each other moment-by-moment». [Clancey 97b]. It
is «grounded» in everyday activity, «an interactive spatial-temporal setting» [Clancey 97a], a notion
that emphasises «the local feedback and time-sensitive nature of action in place» [Clancey 97a] and
behaviour as being «improvised by resequencing and recomposing previous behaviors» [Clancey et.
al. 98].  The detail of behaviour is shaped by continuous reflection on and feedback from what has just
been done.  In this way, cognition is a process of continual readjustment of the next step in the light of
what has just been accomplished: «action changes the person and the environment» [Clancey et.al. 98].
Knowledge is therefore also local, contextual, and continuously changing.
Clancey is somewhat ambiguous about the behavioural aspect since elsewhere he merges it with the
social or functional perspective [Clancey 97a].  It does however appear to be a distinct and useful
analytical category, not least as from a temporal perspective it lies ‘between’ the social and the
structural forms of knowledge.  Time in the functional sense of situated is implicitly ‘long’ relative to
behavioural situatedness since behavioural processes always occur within social-functional contexts.  
The link between these two situated aspects of cognition can be illustrated by a reflective account of
craft blacksmithing, framed within activity theory  [Keller and Keller 93].  This account describes how
one of them, an amateur blacksmith, prepares for and begins to make something ‘in the spirit’ of a
19th century kitchen implement by examining historical examples and records; reviewing other
information about the tools, previous making of similar tools, and information about materials, skills,
and production constraints [Keller and Keller 93].  In this way «an umbrella plan, an internal
representation of goal and procedure.» [Keller and Keller 93] could be formed which was
subsequently modified in the course of the manufacturing process: «microorganizations of task
conception and material conditions, are developed in the act of production ... .  It is in these specific
productive steps that reorganizations of knowledge and action take place» [Keller & Keller 93].  They
concluded:
One needs, therefore, to know enough directly or indirectly to conceptualize an orientation
toward a goal: to provide a combinatorial arrangement of previous knowledge in the service of
a new, and therefore partially unknown, production.  Beyond this point ... what one needs to
know to behave appropriately becomes a product of behaving. ... «All one needs to know» is
only specifiable on the attainment of a goal ... . [Keller and Keller 93].
The cognitive processes involved in this activity were socially situated by the maker’s concern to meet
social expectations of the 1990s about the authenticity of 19th century replica tools.   In order for the
artefact to be ‘in the spirit’ of a genuine one, they used relevant sources of information to determine
what it might look like, and so on. Further, manufacturing was behaviourally situated in that, as they
put it, «what one needs to know ... becomes a product of behaving».  Interaction with the implement-
in-the-making, together with internal representing and conceptualization, shaped the next act on a
«moment-by-moment basis».  
The third, structural, dimension of situatedness concerns the «physical structure of knowledge»
[Clancey et. al. 98]. It is largely a hypothesis about brain functioning and the manifestation of
knowledge as capacity to act at that level for which he draws on Edelman’s theory of neuronal group
selection [Clancey 97a; Edelman & Tononi 95] and on ecological psychology [Clancey 97a].  This
review leads him to develop a model of cognition in which «perception, conception, and action are
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physically coordinated» [Clancey 97a].  Thus, for example, we perceive a two-dimensional drawing as
three-dimensional because we perceive drawings as being about things in the world we have
encountered: «human perception and meaning attribution arise together; they are coupled through
experience and influence each other.» [Clancey 97a].  Cognition is situated, from this perspective,
because conceptualizing is linked to sensori-motor coordination [Clancey 97a].  This aspect of
cognition is linked to the other two through the ‘mechanism’ of conceptualization - «The
conceptualization of a social action involves a kind of internal feedback that permits people to conceive
that they are conceiving ...» [Clancey 97a].  From the temporal perspective this dimension is
‘contained’ within the behavioural one while at the same time it pervades and underlies all cognitive
activity.
If ‘knowledge’ is a capacity, ‘embodied’ in conceptualization (a neural process) and in behaviour and
social actions, what are we to make of books, computer file contents and other things we typically refer
to when we speak of ‘knowledge’?  One of the strengths of Clancey’s discussion of situated
cognition is that it provides an perspective that also facilitates conceptual development of knowledge
management. Clancey argued that those artefacts such as books, maps, instructions, goal statements,
beliefs and so on, that we typically refer to as ‘knowledge’ are really representations of knowledge
[Clancey 95].  (He might rather perhaps have said that some artefacts are themselves containers of
knowledge representations.) The distinction between representations of knowledge, and knowledge not
being equivalent or interchangeable, is crucial.  As Clancey put it, figuratively speaking, knowledge
representations lie ‘between’ performances – the past performance that is reflected on, and the future
performance toward which end ‘knowing’ is directed , [Clancey 97b].  He indicated this relationship
with the following diagram:
past activity future activity
naming
history telling
explaining
planning
designing
improvisation-
in-action
improvised
action
reflection:
pattern description
and theories
Figure 2: Descriptions lie between performances
[Source: © American Association for Artificial Intelligence.  Reproduced with permission from
Clancey, W. J. 1997b, Figure 2, p. 260]
In order for representations to bring into being a capacity on the part of a sentient being, to become
knowledge, in the situated cognitive sense, they have to be re-conceptualized [Clancey 95].  Use of
representations always involves interpretation and creativity, and interpretation is always contextual
[Clancey 95; 97b; Gourlay 01].  Representations are thus tools for inquiry [Clancey 97b].
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4. Towards an Integrated Framework
Alexander et. al.'s model is a dualist one.  They posit a knowing individual, bearing «prior knowledge»
in their head.  By approaching the issue in this way they have then to pose and face the classic
epistemological question of how what is 'in the head' can be 'connected' with what has been defined
implicitly as 'the outside world'.  For this they proposed the idea of 'construction', and site or set of
processes that relate the individual to the world, and at the same time cause the selective transformation
of tacit into explicit knowledge (in their sense of these terms).  If we abandon the inherent dualism of
their model, we can bring it into line with situated cognition, thereby providing a richer model overall.
The dualism of life-form vs. environment whereby life-form reacts to environmental stimuli is
equivalent to the classic behaviourist stimulus (S) response (R) model, often depicted in the form
S→R.  The S→R perspective on the organism:environment relationship was criticized from as early as
1896 when Dewey argued that stimulus and response should be seen as mutually determining, not as
sequential [Dewey 1896]. Similarly Piaget wrote that: «we should at least write S↔R, or S→(A)→R
(where A stands for assimilation into a schema)» [Piaget 71] instead of S→R.  From this perspective,
the individual's 'prior knowledge' affects what becomes a stimulus, and thus what transforms prior
(tacit) knowledge into explicit knowledge.  Moreover, based on Piaget's notion of schema as formed
through organism↔environment transactions [Piaget 71], and Edelman and Tononi’s idea of neuronal
structures [Edelman & Tononi 95], we can envisage that this organism↔environment transaction
influences both the neuronal 'shape' and the social 'content' of tacit knowledge.
To illustrate, think of an individual who is not conscious, but asleep.  We can regard that individual as
having a reservoir of  'prior knowledge' that is largely inert.  (Inert, that is, from the perspective of
knowledge management as it is likely to be active in a special way, to do with physiological and other
unconscious processes).  As that person awakens, the quality of their transactions with their
environment changes, and with this change explicit knowledge is formed as tacit knowledge is
‘awakened’ or perhaps better, is ‘reconstituted’ or ‘reconstructed’.  Tacit knowledge becomes explicit
only through the actions of that individual in the world, and is also transformed by such transactions.
Similarly, 'explicit knowledge' 'recedes' back to the tacit reservoir when it is no longer being activated.
From this perspective, Clancey’s ‘knowledge’ appears similar to Alexander et.al.’s explicit knowledge
- it is that situated capacity of an agent.  Alexander et. al.’s framework helps draw attention to what is
retained from one situation to the next, and how it is retained - as tacit (implicitly neural) processes or
structures that will both shape and be shaped by future organism↔environment transactions.
We are not concerned here with the wider implications of this framework, but with the issues of what
this approach implies for managing knowledge, and in particular, what it implies about the role of the
human agent and human talent in knowledge management.  Before doing that it is useful to note two
other perspectives that also appear to complement this ‘situative’ view of knowledge and knowing -
autopoiesis, and connectionism
Von Krogh and his co-authors have outlined an «anti-representationist» theory of organizational
knowledge based on autopoiesis [von Krogh et.al. 96; Venzin et.al. 98] a theory originally developed
in neurobiology to explain the functioning of biological organisms [Capra 96; von Krogh et.al. 96].
At its heart is the notion of a closed, self-sustaining system of interacting components, such as a
biological cell [Capra 96]. According to von Krogh and his colleagues, autopoietic theory suggests that
«cognition is a creative act of bringing forth a world.  Knowledge is a component of the autopoietic
(self-productive) process ... [and] is not abstract but rather is embodied in the individual ...».
Knowledge is something known by individuals, and is thus dependent on their viewpoints.  Venzin et.
al. (1998) suggested that from the autopoietic perspective, knowledge can be defined as something that
«resides in the mind, body, and the social system.  It is observer- and history-dependent, context-
Gourlay, ISMICK, 2001
sensitive ...».  This clearly suggests some overlap between situated cognition, and autopoiesis, a view
endorsed by Sierhuis and Clancey (1997).
Venzin et.al. (1998) have proposed the idea of a «connectionist epistemology», based on connectionist
(neural network) computing.  In this light they have suggested that organizational knowledge can be
seen as «a state in a system of interconnected individuals», and knowledge as «dependent on the state
of the network of interconnected components.» [Venzin et.al. 98]. Edelman (1992) believes that
connectionist models are poor analogues of  brain functioning, and it remains to be seen whether they
are any better for organizations.  The epistemological implications of connectionism are also unclear.
While it adheres to key assumptions of representationism, particularly in seeing the environment as the
prime source of knowledge [Venzin et.al. 98] it also undermines representationist models [Werner
et.al. 93; van Gelder 96].  Some versions of connectionism appear compatible with analyses of
mediated action [Wertsch 98], and distributed cognition [see e.g. Hutchins 93], two other perspectives
which have strong affinities with 'situative' approaches.
5. Implications for Knowledge Management
Before turning to consider some of the implications of this framework we should remember that
knowledge management processes and activities should be designed to meet the needs of the
organization.  They are not ends in themselves.  Therefore the specific implications of this kind of
framework for knowledge management will depend on the knowledge management needs of different
kinds of activity and organization.  Nevertheless, some general implications can be drawn out here.  
This framework suggests above all that it is useful to distinguish ‘knowledge’ from ‘knowledge
representations’.  We can use the term ‘knowledge’ meaning prior or tacit knowledge (in Alexander
et.al.’s broader sense) to refer generally to the capacity for acting in the world that people ‘bring’ with
them to any situation.  It has been shaped by their previous activities, and will be developed and
maintained by future activities.  Activity by the organism ‘triggers’ an ‘awakening’ of parts of the total
tacit knowledge ‘reservoir’ of an individual in ways that are situated with respect to that neurally based
reservoir, to the immediate activity itself, and to the socio-cultural context within which it occurs.
Activated tacit knowledge, now termed explicit knowledge, in the wider sense of this term, is thus
situated, and localized.
Knowledge that is explicit in the wider sense has the potential to be expressed in words, and thus made
‘explicit’ in the narrower (knowledge management) sense.  In other words, knowledge representations
can be generated from explicit knowledge.  But it should always be recognized that they were created
in specific situations, and will bear the marks of their creation.  Furthermore, that they will be
‘consumed’ in other specific situations.  In so far as this ‘consumption’ process typically involves
reading texts, and reading is also a constructive situated activity, not to be understood as simply a
mechanistic process of ‘knowledge transfer’ [Gourlay 01] then the significance and impact of
knowledge representations is also situationally determined.
Situated cognition highlights the historically and socially situated nature of any knowledge
management process.  Knowledge is seen as situated in communities of practice, in actual ongoing
behaviour, and in neural form bound to both of these.  It is integral to groups and their practices or
activities and is therefore effectively inseparable from activity, and thus from the work of managing
those activities, and the people who carry them out.  It is not possible to manage knowledge directly
because it is not a manageable substance but a capacity: it is human talent.  Emphasis must therefore
fall on managing the conditions under which that capacity is developed, maintained, and realized.  On
this basis Sierhuis and Clancey (1997) argued that «knowledge management becomes the management
of the process of legitimate peripheral participation», a concept developed by Lave and Wenger (1991)
to describe an apprenticeship-like form of learning through practice akin to informal and incidental
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learning processes [Marsick and Watkins 90; Garrick 98a,b].  Situated cognition thus links knowledge
management directly and inextricably with learning in organizational contexts, particularly learning
through practice.
‘Knowing in action’ necessarily and irreducibly involves people at work, and the management of the
‘process of legitimate peripheral participation’ requires skills and knowledge derived from the
behavioural sciences, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history.  In organizations with
a typical division of labour among management specialisms, these skills are most likely to be found in
human resource development, training, occupational psychology, and human resource management or
personnel specialists.  Since human activities are central so must the behavioural sciences be to the
management of knowledge. ‘Knowledge management’ can only work, not as a directive process
attempting to control a substance, ‘knowledge’, but as a facilitative process.
Knowledge representations also have to be managed as part of the overall portfolio of knowledge
management activities and behavioural specialists will naturally have to work with people skilled in
such fields, including computing and information scientists, and information systems analysts.  This
brings us to the more familiar set of activities - the acquisition, storage, accessing and so on of
knowledge representations.  It is here we find activities such as knowledge acquisition, and the
development of ever more sophisticated methods of storing, disseminating, and accessing knowledge
representations.  It should always be born in mind, however, that knowledge representations only
become knowledge in specific contexts, through human processes of selection and construction, using
knowledge representations among other artefacts where they appear significant in the ongoing context
of action.
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